

Letter number (85)

Peace be upon you, God's mercy and His blessings. Our honorable sheikhs, we ask God that this letter reaches you well, and we ask God to steadfast you and all brothers and conquer the land and break the Crusader campaign by your hands, for He is all capable. As for what follows:

- As for the refusal of our master, the Commander of the Faithful, may God preserve him, to pardon me, the poor slave, we say nothing but we listen and obey and there is no might or power except with God. We ask God to have mercy on us and make us steadfast until we meet Him.

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1 - As for the little girl, the truth is that she has no guilt in the case. As for the idea of kidnapping, as we mentioned to you, that when the Ansari brother returned from the land of the Two Holy Mosques [Saudi Arabia], he sat with the brothers and knew their financial conditions. Thus, his first concern was to return the stolen money. He thought of finding a way to pressure his cousin to return the money, so the idea of kidnapping his daughter came to him because he knows how much her father is attached to her and that he will inevitably give in and return the money. He never expected her father to leave her and run away, that's first.

Second: The thief used to move in Aden with his in-laws most of the time and they were Bedouins and always had their weapons with them. The work groups in Aden did not exceed three individuals, a driver brother and two executive brothers. They saw that the process of his kidnapping may involve a clash because of his armed in-laws, and for this they need at least two brothers by their side if they want to kidnap him, because Aden is very crowded and there is a large security spread. Any operation must be very quick, otherwise the brothers may get exposed.

Third: The safe houses of the brothers in Aden are limited, and they will be tired of hiding the man and silencing him in a room in a security shelter usually adjacent to the houses next to it, unlike the case of a little girl. After this, the Ansari brother sat with the brothers and told them that it was better for them to kidnap the girl and that he knew her father and uncles and that they would put pressure on him and try to cover up the story and quickly end it.

As for why the brothers did not at least kidnap a man?

First: All the brothers of the thief live outside Aden. Second: The Ansari brother assured the brothers that the heart of the thief would only move on his daughter and caused him pressure even among his family.

2- As for Abu Hadi, on the contrary, the brothers sat with him and advised him more than once, the last of which was a session in which we ordered all the adult immigrant brothers to sit with him for a final advice session, perhaps he would come back to his senses, but to no avail. He was a rebel in every sense of the word against orders and instructions to begin with. Moreover, he neglected his emirs and those responsible for him at the time and does what he wants. If one of the brothers came to him reminding him that he violated the instructions and that going out is forbidden, he replied that you have nothing to do with me and let me be on my way. Then he sits with the soldiers and incites them. Likewise, after his situation worsened, his emir at the time, Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi, ordered him to enter prison, but he refused to enter prison, and a problem arose between them. He raised his voice and made everyone in the shelter hear him,

while he's talking bad. At that time, the security apparatus was weak, so they did not raise this issue their leaders because that would cause a bigger problem.

As for his appearance in the video titled "Those who Sacrifice Their Souls," as we mentioned to you that the number of those who are familiar with the subject of assassinations - after God Almighty - do not go beyond the fingers of one hand, and for this reason neither the media nor anyone else knows about this topic at all. The reason it spread among most of the brothers is either that the matter is assassinations by National Security to create trouble between the [Islamic] State and the organization [AQAP], or it is a mutual liquidation between the State and the organization, as the State killed Hussam al-Ta'azi and the organization responded by killing Abu Hadi. Therefore, after this was shown by the media in the aforementioned video, we did not talk to them and left it as it is.

3- As for the issue of transferring the Houthi personnel from one point to another, it happened nearly two years ago and is as follows: At the beginning of the Houthi invasion of the southern regions in Yemen, the war was at its most intense between them and the apostates of the resistance. The Houthis had controlled most of the southern regions, and we were then outside Aden, specifically in the north of Aden. At that time, we intended to go to al-Raydah to follow the brothers and then go down to Mukalla. To get to Al Raydah, we had to enter Aden and then leave it from the east in the direction of Abyan and from there to Shabwa until we reached al Raydah. However, after we communicated with the brothers and followed up on road matters, it became clear that entering and exiting Aden is very difficult. The same applies to moving from there to Abyan and then to Shabwa, as the Houthis used to stop traveling cars and force any young man aged 15 and over out of the car, and often transferred them to their prisons in the northern regions. Then we searched the status of another road to reach al-Raydah, which is a road through Yafi', then al-Bayda, Dhamar, Sana'a, Ma'rib and from there to al-Raydah. This road was passable, and a number of brothers passed through it, for Houthis have settled in most of that area, and there is no strictness in it like the areas where the war is taking place. At that time, we wanted to send one of the private security brothers to go to the city of Ibb in the Wilayat al-Liwa al-Akhdar to bring Hakim al-Harbi - may God forgive him. That happened after he told us that he was repentant and wanted one of the brothers to come to him to pull him out after he secretly leaves without the rest of the dissidents knowing about it. The path of the brother who will go to get Hakim was the same road that we wanted to take, so the brother told us that we will move after tomorrow, God willing. Indeed, we moved on time, thanks to God, and the road was clear, thanks to God. Several kilometers before we reached Dhamar, a Houthi checkpoint stopped us, and they asked for our papers and the papers of the car, so we gave them to them. They made sure that they were right, and they returned them to us. Then three of them rode with us and said that they would go down to the next checkpoint. So we moved, and after about six kilometers, we met another checkpoint, so they asked us to stop so that they could get down. We stopped and they left. Then we continued our journey to Dhamar, and from there to Ibb, which is right after it. We arrived and then met Hakim in the agreed-upon place. We greeted him and he apologized to us for what he had done. After we finished our conversation, I went down and ordered the brothers to move. Then I continued my travels via public transportation, and after I reached the brothers in Ma'rib, by the grace of God, I told one of the brothers to contact our brother to make sure that he and Hakim had reached the brothers. He communicated with him and told him that he and Hakim had arrived to the brothers, thanks to God. And after I learned the story from our brother, Salih al-Jazrawi, when he sent his testimony about Hakim, I

sent to our security brother, who went to pick me up and went to get Hakim from Ibb. I told him the words that Hakim spoke and I asked him about the conversation that took place between them during the return. He told me that while they were talking during the travel, he spoke with Hakim spontaneously about what happened to us at the Houthis checkpoint and that they rode with us to the other checkpoint.

4- As for Usayyid al-Ta'zi, we were getting information through the former security official, Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi, as he was linked to some supporters who were not involved with any group in Ta'iz. One of them was almost a brother of our brother al-Zubayr al-Ta'zi, may God accept him. Abu Muhammad was following the news of Usayyid through them without notifying them, and they used to convey to him that Usayyid is the emir of Ta'iz and that he had large groups with him and they stormed government headquarters and banks and looted their contents. Al-Ansari, who provided information to Abu Muhammad, was criticizing how the State makes one like Usayyid an emir of Ta'iz, and how it accepts that he recruits groups of tramps, most of them do not pray. Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi was telling Aal-Ansari that Usayyid is not the emir of Ta'iz, so al-Ansari replied, "How is that when everyone here knows that Usayyid is the emir of the Islamic State in Ta'iz!" And when we communicate with Usayyid and ask him about his news, he says that his affairs are good and that he is going according to what we agreed upon with him, and he did not talk about what he was doing there. The news continued to come to us about him seizing as booties large generators from a government stadium and another from a wedding hall for one of the influential people. After that, we sent an order to Usayyid to come immediately, and he said that he has work and obligations and cannot come now. So we repeated the matter to him and he answered with the same excuse. This matter continued for nearly five months, as we ask for him and he does not respond to the order to attend. He continued his rebellion, and he did not abide by our command to him. We confirmed to him that he was not an emir of Ta'iz and was not responsible for anything in it, and he did not abide by the plan that we had obligated him to work on security, collect information and not appear. Finally, he did not respond to our repeated orders to him to come. We were preoccupied with other issues, for a while, and did not have time for him. His news continued to reach us through Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi, the last of which stating that he spoiled three cars. For the record, all of their work is in the name of the State in Ta'iz, so people in Ta'iz fear him and his group, and at the same time they were wondering, "How could the soldiers of the State have such thought and morals?!" During that period, one of the brothers was assigned to communicate with Abu Habib al-Ta'azi to send his and his family's compensation and the rent of his house. Abu Habib was telling the brother: (The brothers do not accept Usayyid. This man is not simple and he's mobilizing an army here in Ta'iz. A while ago, a problem happened, so he mobilized his men and immediately, four hundred of his men gathered for him.)

After he was liquidated, we assigned one of the brothers to communicate with one of those who were around Usayyid, who is Abul-Walid al-Ta'azi. He was disobedient, as he and his family fled from a security shelter in wilayat Aden Abyan and settled with Usayyid. The brother told him that an order came to him from the brothers to confiscate the items that Usayyid had spoiled in Ta'iz. He asked him about the generators, and he said that one of them remained and was big, but there was a problem because of the distribution of shares and they were waiting for Usayyid to solve it. The brother asked him about the cars spoiled by Usayyid. He refused to hand them over unless Usayyid himself ordered him to do so.

5- What we mentioned to you, part of the testimony of the former security official, Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi, when he said: (Abu Bilal is not cooperating with us, and we feel that he expects that we will arrange something for him after we delayed his going to Aden), was based on what our brother learned at the time from Abu Bilal's dealings, may God accept him, with them while he was in Mukalla. We really never knew Abu Muhammad al-Jazrawi to lie before he fled. We thought maybe this is what Abu Bilal developed in himself because of our repeated questions to him regarding the issue of the killing of the heads of splintering, whether in the first or second schism. They were all spontaneous discussions in ordinary sessions. What increased our preference for this hypothesis is the letter that his wife sent us, asking us about the truth of her husband's death and that she had a great feeling that he was murdered treacherously and was not killed in a raid.

6 - With regard to the wife of sheikh Abu Bilal, may God accept him, regarding the issue of changing the password of the router, we forgot about that and it did not occur to us. As for our allowing her to use the internet, it is actually the opposite, we did not allow her to do so, and she did not ask permission at all, but she used it secretly.

- As for our thoughts that she was sent for a specific job after she escaped from the shelter, that is due to the evidence that we have against her since her arrival and her marriage to Abu Bilal, may God forgive him, until the last events with her.

- As for the three offices, we gathered them at that time after the brothers left Mukalla after the organization handed them over to the apostates. Currently, the brother who runs the wali's office is considered as a carrier to the wali, to whom reports of the committees and their needs, grievances and complaints submitted to the wali are submitted. All that takes place in an encrypted manner. Then he resends them to us after sorting and arranging them on the private mail. At the same time, we have assigned him to be responsible for supervising the Central Office of Media, and they are only three brothers. Therefore, they stay with him at the same safehouse.

As for finance, its delegates were distributed. There is a representative in the Wilayat al-Bayda, one in the Wilayat Aden Abyan, and one in the Wilayat Shabwa. When the money arrives, it is distributed among them according to the needs of the wilayah they are responsible for. Then, they receive instructions for disbursing the allocations for the committees and wilayat through the office official. A while ago, we commissioned a brother of our own and our best security supporters, known only to me and one of the brothers. We commissioned him to build a special safehouse for the office and the media personnel who are with him. The house is almost ready, and some finishes remain, which were delayed by our financial situation. This safehouse, God willing, in a very excellent area, far from the problems and the ongoing war, and no one knows about it. We will move them to it soon, God willing.

- It is a fact, we did not mention that sheikh Abu Bilal's wife, may God accept him, knew that her reality had been exposed, and we mentioned to you, O our sheikhs, may God protect you, that our suspicions are due to the evidence against her since her arrival to the last events with her. We did not make the ruling purely upon us, rather, the security official at the time was a witness and present, and we consulted him about her more than once.

Among the confessions made by the spy, Abu Ya'la al-Shadadi, when we caught him, who had been with the [AQ] organization for six years, was that when he and a group of spies were sent to the organization, they were instructed that they should not do anything other than to try to improve their image and show their competence in aspects of work. Eventually, this will help to gain the trust of their emirs, so that they depend on them in greater matters and reach higher places on the administrative ladder of the organization. With time, this emir or leader, whom they gained his trust, would be a defender and advocate for them in the event that something suspicious came around them. Indeed, this malicious person arrived at the central workshop for explosives belonging to the organization. Likewise, the spy Abu Anas al-'Adani also made it to the security apparatus. On one occasion, some doubts arose around him on the security side, but the one who defended him, was Qasim al-Rimi himself. He denied this and ordered to appoint him as a general security commander of al-Shabwa, which was the center of their wilayat and the most important for them at the time. There are many other examples. After the declaration of the Islamic State in Yemen, orders came to Abu Ya'la, may God disgrace him, to join the State, may God honor it, and do the same work he had done in the organization, which is to gain the trust of the State leadership. Then, when the security apparatus captured him, they did not tell us about that until after he confessed. By God, we were very surprised. If they had told us about him before they caught him, we would have ordered them to wait. We think that the spy may not escape sometimes, even if he suspects that someone is suspicious of him. He resorts to filing a complaint with those who trust and know him among the leaders, whom he won their trust before. He would tell them that so-and-so is a traitor or has doubts against him, and so on. This also depends on the intelligence of the spy and his claim. For this reason, we were not surprised that the sheikh's wife stayed in touch with the supporters after her escape. She sees that since she was the wife of the former Shari'ah official, no one will be suspicious about her. We have known her audacity through the period in which she previously lived in the safehouse and through her communication with us in her letters.

- As for why we didn't investigate her? We have mentioned to you our sheikhs, may God protect you, our situation at that stage, and we had no place to hold the cases of rebellious men, let alone the women. It was difficult to deal with her or imprison her because of her boldness. She would have cause problems and confusion, and even the ansari whom she stayed with, he and his wife might get emotionally effected. If one of our sheikhs, may God grant them success, were with us, he would have seen the reality of the situation and knew our condition closely.

7- As for how Usayyid's wife knew that he was captured or killed by us, this rumor was spread by the organization, may God disgrace them. The rumor reached Usayyid's brothers and his wife either through Usayyid's brothers or through correspondence and groups in the Telegram. At the present stage, we think it is best to remain silent and not respond to it with any response.

8- As for the letter that al-Kinani left when he fled, we will attach it to you, God willing, and to be clear, we did not read the letter until we received it now to enclose it to you. This is a shortcoming on our part, and we ask God's forgiveness.

9 - Regarding Abul-Bara al-Maqdisi, yes, this happened about a week or ten days after his escape, and the brothers told us that al-Maqdisi, according to his words, got lost and was afraid

to continue the road alone outside of Qaifa. Thus, he had no way out except through the organization, but he didn't do that out of fear for his religion. He continued walking to an area in Qaifa called al-Jawf, and he went to a man there and told him that he was lost and that he wanted to reach Shabwa. By God's grace, this man was in contact with one of the security ansar in the area. Several days later, and after he doubted the status of al-Maqdisi, he contacted our brother al-Ansari and told him about al-Maqdisi. He described to him what he looked like, so the brother recognized him and told the brothers about his situation. On about the same day that the man called the brothers, al-Maqdisi asked the man to call one of the supporters of the State, may God glorify it, in the region, so the man did that, and al-Maqdisi took the mobile and spoke to the brother, stating that he wanted to return. Then, the brothers arranged with the man in al-Jawf, so he brought al-Maqdisi to them and they put him in the prison.

- As for Abu Ammar, he does not have any work at the moment and he is a soldier, and currently the brothers left him in a semi-arrest site near a security point for the brothers. The security brothers currently want to put him in a cell and start the interrogation with him, but there is no empty cell at the moment and they will take him after they conclude some cases that are in prison now. As for vouching, it is a fact that no one vouched for him, and he came to us through the decimated Mamoun Hatim, may God disgrace him. Before our return from the Levant, Abu Bilal and the brothers had settled in the al-Saddah area in Ibb, which is the village of Mamoun Hatim, who was at that time one of the supporters of the State, for his ambitions to be an emir and gain prestige. While Abu Bilal was there, Mamoun Hatem once told him that he would introduce him to his son-in-law, who is a professional media person. This son-in-law was Abu 'Ammar himself, and sheikh Abu Bilal sat with him many times and was affected by his character and morals. After I reached the brothers and conveyed to them the message of the brothers and the assignment of sheikh Abu Bilal, may God accept him, to administer the wilayat of Yemen, the sheikh appointed him to be in charge of the media because this is his specialty.

The bottom line is that he was not vouched for by anyone we know. The brothers received recent information that Abu 'Ammar's older brother works in the American embassy in Sana'a, and the brothers are still verifying it. Also, for your information, when Abu 'Ammar was in charge of the media, he recruited his younger brother Abu Zaid, who is more professional in the media than Abu 'Ammar. He made him beside him in the central media, and Abu Zaid is still in the central media until now.

- As for Abul-Khayr al-Qasimi, his current work is as a da'wah member affiliated with the Da'wah Committee. We had arrested him and isolated him from the soldiers for a while because of some of the issues he raised. After the brothers told us about his improvement and change, we ordered the legal official to use him again in the da'wah, so he would go out and preach in Friday [prayers] in some mosques in the villages, and he goes on visits to the brothers in the battalion near him and goes to ribat as well.

As for the issues that he raised from time to time, the most important of them are:

- The issue of the necessity of saying out loud the truth about the ruling against al-Qa'ida or regarding any controversial issue, whether it is in the doctrine or jurisprudence. This saying out loud the truth we mean here is between soldiers and in the face of emirs and so on. The Shari'ah

official told us after that to go and discuss this issue with him. Then the Shari'ah official told us that he met with him and apologized. However, the problem is that if he meets for a long periods with the soldiers and one of the soldiers asks him a question, there is no doubt that he would say out loud the truth and so on.

- The issue that he used to say on some issues: (I am on the doctrine of those who obey God in this matter). The Shari'ah official also told us that he's been excused from this after meeting with him.

He also has a problem in terms of dealing with the brothers and even the two da'wah personnel, as he is very difficult to deal with, and according to what the brothers have told us, he would stop communicating with the two da'wah personnel or the brothers he had if they did not attend a session he delivers in the safehouse.

10 - Regarding the three people from Ta'iz, the brothers imprisoned them after they finished preparing the cells, because they were arranging to escape. As for the cars, we do not expect them to return them. Also, if we release them and they escape, they will not return, and we have stated to you at the top that Usayyid put the cars at one of his people and told him not to give them to anyone unless that one is sent by Usayyid himself.

11 - We did not meet with our brother 'Abdul-Wahid al-'Iraqi yet, but we sent him a letter in which we answered him about some problems. We told him that we would come to meet with him soon. We preferred not to open with him the subject of the notes that we received about him except by meeting directly with him. The reason for our delay is that a problem happened on the road leading to Qaifa between a group of apostates from a tribe and the brothers, so we advised the brothers not to move to them and to delay that a little.

12 - With regard to the Indian priest's deal, negotiations have been suspended for nearly three weeks due to the absence of the person who was communicating with the brothers.

- The brothers have completed the construction of six small cells to accommodate some of the cases that occur to them, and the brothers are trying to build other cells, God willing.

- We will attach to you a list of the used ammunition in addition to what is left in the general stockpile in Qaifa. The remaining is a list of the armaments of the personnel, as the brothers brought it to us and it had errors, so we asked them to rearrange it, as well as some weapons and ammunition that the brothers could not get out of Aden, in addition to some weapons in Yafi', which the brothers were unable to transfer after the security deployments due to the difficulty of that. We will send it in a list with the next letter, God willing.

Note: There is a slight problem with the different kunyas of some brothers between the list of individuals and the list of the sponsored brothers in Yemen. We talked to the brothers and they mentioned that this is because some of the brothers changed their kunyas after they reached Qaifa, and we asked them to match and modify them.

- As for striking the neighboring states of disbelief, in fact all the good brothers are assigned with the work in other sections, but we will try to nominate a suitable brother as soon as possible. As

for Oman, one of the security brothers has provided us with general information about it, and that the biggest problem is the entry of weapons and explosives to it. As for transferring them after that between its inner cities, it is easy, and there are no thorough inspections of cars except for the question about the identity card and the driver's license. He mentioned that it is possible to hit some embassies of the countries of the Crusader Coalition by means of inghimasis either with belts or weapons. The brothers are studying a gap through which they may be able to bring in weapons and explosives to Oman, but it requires an Omani brother to enter Yemen officially, suggest a method and try it. Currently, the Omani brother who escaped Oman and joined us is trying to arrange for a clean brother to enter Yemen, but he is a little late. We also suggest to delay targeting Oman a little if we want to hit the Emirates and its environs, because the smuggling route to the Emirates, whether for brothers or explosives and weapons, passes through Oman. If it is struck, security in it will be greatly tightened, especially on the borders. Also, the route of clean brothers who want to migrate to Yemen is currently through Oman, so if the brother's passport is authorized to enter Yemen without a visa, he enters Oman with a tourist visa and then enters Yemen through the land port with ease.

- We ask you, our sheikhs, may God protect you, to send us detailed mechanisms for the work of some of your wilayat, whether they are military, administrative or security, and the relationship between the committees and the limits of their powers in the wilayah, so that we can benefit from that and adjust it according to what suits our circumstances.

- We would like to inform you, O our sheikhs, may God reward you, that we have noticed the issue of harassment of the young men as stated in the disclosure of some of the observations on the individuals, although the brothers rejected a lot of young men at the present time. We ask for your advice in a deterrent solution, for there must be a punishment that will deter those who have a disease in their hearts.

Your soldier:

Abu Usamah al-Muhajir

27/ Jumadah al-Akhirah / 1438 AH [26 March 2017]